Regulations on conflict of interest for higher civil servants and public officials - Enhancing a state’s legitimacy or just a pretty illusion? by Tømmerås, Ane
Lund University  STVK02 
Department of Political Science  Tutor: Per Andersson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulations on conflict of interest for higher 
civil servants and public officials 
 
Enhancing a state’s legitimacy or just a pretty illusion? 
 
 
 
 
Ane Margrete Tømmerås
  
Abstract 
OECD and other organizations argues in favor of the implementation of 
regulations on conflict of interest for higher civil servants and public officials, 
often including quarantine time for these employees when changing jobs. They do 
this with the argument that it will increase the population’s confidence in their 
governments, which again is claimed to be a cornerstone of the functioning of the 
states.  
The goal of this study is to investigate the connection between regulations on 
conflict of interest and state legitimacy. It is done so through a quantitative study 
on the OECD-countries, where it is almost even divided between the countries 
that have and do not have these regulations. 
 The result of the quantitative study implies that regulations on conflict of interest 
do not have an impact on state legitimacy. Different explanations are presented, 
varying from the actual need of the regulation as a whole to the need of 
formalizing a normative concept. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 What is the puzzle in regulations on conflict of 
interest? 
Regulations on conflict of interest has in some countries received great media 
attention, in connection with higher public officials changing to a job in a related 
field in private sector. An example that can be mentioned is when the former 
Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, shortly after losing the election in 2006, 
took a job in the PR-sector. Many were skeptical to this change and with this the 
possibility to misuse information and contacts that are not public knowledge 
(SVT, 2007).  
A puzzle in regulations on conflict of interest is whether or not they have the 
desired effects when being implemented. This thesis will focus on state 
legitimacy, as this is an effect spoken of from several actors. Regulations on 
conflict of interest and state legitimacy will be further defined in chapter 3, 
Definitions and delimitations. 
An interesting aspect of these types of regulations is how they are spoken for from 
organizations like Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) (Bertók & 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003; GRECO, 
2013). They are consistently using the argument that regulations on conflict of 
interest are increasing and strengthening to the public’s trust in their national 
government, which is also the main argument that can be identified in specific 
existing governments regulations on conflict of interest (Lindström & Bruun, 
2012; Moderniseringsdepartementet, 2005).  
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In several reports from OECD, the need of regulations on conflict of interest for 
higher civil servant and public officials is promoted and encouraged toward all 
member countries. The reports are unanimous on their advice in recommending to 
implement these types of regulations. The motive for the regulations is by OECD 
presented to increase the peoples trust in the government, which is assumed to be 
a crucial part of a state’s functioning. These statements are made without 
references to any actual studies on the field (Bertók & Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2003, 2010; OECD iLibrary & Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013).  
Other organizations like GRECO and ESO have also published reports where the 
argument for these regulations is that they will lead to increased trust in the 
government. This again will be beneficial for the state’s legitimacy, a trail of 
thought that is easily identified in the reports (GRECO, 2013; Lindström & 
Bruun, 2012). 
The lack of research on the field of regulations on conflict of interest is 
noteworthy. Not even OECD refers to any concrete research on the effect of these 
regulations and more specific their effect on state legitimacy. This leaves us 
wondering whether or not their policy recommendations actually fulfill the 
purpose intended. It awakens a curiosity on what effects they might have and if 
the arguments of big organizations like OECD and GRECO actual have support 
for their statements. 
Another part of regulations on conflict of interests that awakens interest, is the 
fact that countries quite similar, differs in whether or not they have these types of 
regulations. For example, in contrast to the other Scandinavian countries, Sweden 
does not have any regulations on conflict of interest (Lindström & Bruun, 2012). 
Other similar countries, like Portugal and Greece, also differ when it comes to 
these regulations (Bertók & Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2010). This raises a curiosity on the need and effect of these 
regulations, and if similar countries do differ because of these regulations. 
As will be argued further on in the thesis, legitimacy is desirable in every state. 
After the financial crisis of 2007, keeping and increasing government’s legitimacy 
has again come into great focus with papers writing about “legitimacy crisis” 
being a factor of the slow recovery of the economy(La Guardia, 2013). Statements 
that legitimacy is a crucial factor when rebuilding the economy, based on the 
trustworthiness of the state is presented in media. The knowledge of what 
increases state legitimacy is therefore an actual and important research question. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the impact that conflict of interest 
regulations have on a state’s legitimacy. This leads to the question of issue: 
What is the impact of regulations on conflict of interest on a state’s legitimacy?  
To answer this, a quantitative study will be presented. The thesis will first present 
previous research and theories on the subject, before reaching definitions on state 
legitimacy and regulations on conflict of interest. Moving on to the empirical part, 
I will test if regulations on conflict of interest have an effect on state legitimacy 
using regressions and test for possible errors in the model. In the study these 
results will be used in an analysis with the theoretical background in mind. 
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2 Theoretical background 
Regulations on conflict of interest is a field where not many studies have been 
made. Studies on bureaucracy and professionals within the state is a broad area 
within the field of political science, but regulations on conflict of interest is a 
quite new and narrow area, where policy seem to have come before research 
(Bertók & Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010; 
Garsten, Rothstein, & Svallfors, 2015, p. 7–ff).  
The positive effects are mainly argued to be increasing legitimacy and trust in the 
government. The arguments against these types of regulations is based on the 
increased difficulty in recruiting qualified employees to the government, and the 
uneconomic side of carrying through quarantine time. This is also the arguments 
performed in Sweden, when the parliament voted down a law proposal on 
regulations on conflict of interest (Lindström & Bruun, 2012; Shekarabi, 2013). 
State legitimacy on the other hand, is often studied, but seldom quantitatively. The 
majority of studies and literature on state legitimacy are theoretical discussions, 
pointing out the desired way of reaching high levels of legitimacy (Gilley, 2006b, 
p. 500). Different studies point out different main variables that affect legitimacy, 
but not too many of these variables have been tested quantitatively. One reason is 
the difficulty to measure curtain variables, but also the challenging aspect of 
finding an adequate operationalization of the concept of state legitimacy (Gilley, 
2006b, pp. 499–501). 
Even so, operationalization of legitimacy and what measures that affects it, has 
been done. To generalize, it is possible to categorize these main variables in two 
groups - socioeconomic and political variables. Merriam argues that security, 
welfare, freedom and justice is the principal factors that would give higher state 
legitimacy (Merriam, 1945, pp. 30–32). Lipset uses government quality and 
effectiveness as ground variables when measuring, weighting the people’s 
expectations to their governments in the operationalization (Lipset, 1959, p. 86).  
The literature on legitimacy has manly focused on how improvements in social 
and economic situations possibly leading to citizens acceptance of the government 
(Gilley, 2006a, pp. 48–52). Within this, welfare (including factors like education, 
health, inequality and level of consumption) is seen as an important variable, 
alongside with democratic variables and well-functioning governments. This 
correlates with Merriam’s and Lipset’s main factors affecting state legitimacy, 
giving wide support for the importance of justice, welfare, government quality 
and freedom as contributions to high levels of state legitimacy. 
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Demography is also a mentioned variable in the literature, such as regional effects 
and western culture (Gilley, 2006a, pp. 49–51; Huntington, 2011). This will not be 
further considered in the thesis, see 3.3 Theoretical scope. 
The research on state legitimacy is, as mentioned, heavily based on theoretical 
discussions. There are of course also done quantitatively research, like Gilley 
presented in here in this thesis, but studies testing concrete variables like 
regulation on conflict of interest on state legitimacy is rather limited. A study 
testing one possible variable on state legitimacy will therefore give an interesting 
look on state legitimacy and what factor that influence it. 
In the research field of legitimacy, there seem to be a consensus on legitimacy 
being a cornerstone of the modern state (Gilley, 2006b, p. 499). What affects this 
concept and why, still seem to be a big discussion between researchers.  
In an attempt to encapsulate the existing literature on state legitimacy, one could 
say that the concept of legitimacy is divided in three key components. These three 
components could be categorized as legality, normative validity and consent, 
where it differs what weight of importance the different components are given and 
what is included in each component when being operationalized (Beetham, 2013, 
pp. 3–37; Gilley, 2009, pp. 2–16).  
Legality could in short terms be described as the state exercising their power in 
accordance with current laws, established rules and customs (Beetham, 2013, pp. 
16–17). The important part of legality is that the rules are general and predictable, 
that again will contribute in creating legitimacy (Gilley, 2006b, p. 502). 
Normative validation is where power is accepted in terms of shared principles and 
values (Gilley, 2006a, pp. 502–503). Shared beliefs on what is “the rightful source 
of authority” and how they should possess this power is a dominating part of this 
component (Beetham, 2013, pp. 17–18).  
Consent is explained as the people’s active contribution providing consent, which 
again is interpreted as legitimacy for the state. This component requires action 
from the citizens that implies their support or acceptance for the government/state 
(Beetham, 2013, p. 17–ff). 
What variables that contributes to these components is not agreed upon in the 
literature. In example, rule of law and low levels of corruption is argued for within 
the component of legality. Some argue that high levels of welfare creates consent, 
others that democratic rights will have an effect on normative validation. 
Researchers focus differently as well. In example, Gilley weights normative 
validation heavier than the two other components in his research, while Weber 
focuses mainly on legality (Beetham, 2013, pp. 15–25; Gilley, 2009, p. 29–ff; 
Rawls & Freeman, 1999, pp. 529–564; Weber, Gerth, & Mills, 1948). 
In the next chapter I will be using the key concepts from the theoretical 
background to define state legitimacy and regulations on conflict of interest. The 
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key components from the theoretical part will used to create a measureable 
definition of state legitimacy and concrete define regulations on conflict of 
interest. 
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3 Definitions and delimitations 
3.1 Definition of state legitimacy 
 
The definition of legitimacy in this paper will also work as the papers limitation. 
How to define legitimacy, as presented above, is complex. Different definitions 
will be presented and discussed before reaching what will be the working 
definition in this thesis. 
With the broad literature on state legitimacy follows a just as wide range of 
definitions. All definitions have their limitations and disadvantages. The goal is to 
have a short, measurable definition that include as much as possible. Choosing a 
measurable definition is almost always choosing away as much as including, 
which makes it a difficult process. 
In his book, Gilley uses the definition; “a state, meaning the institutions and 
ideologies of a political system, is more legitimate the more that it holds and 
exercises political power with legality, justification, and consent from the 
standpoint of all citizens”(Gilley, 2009, p. 11). This definition includes all the 
three key components of legitimacy, and is therefore also a broad definition. 
Beetham uses a similar definition, including all three aspects (Beetham, 2013, pp. 
3–41). The problem with these definitions is the lack of possibilities to 
conceptualize state legitimacy, leaving the concept to a theoretical discussion 
rather than a measurable variable. Even so, the importance of the citizen’s 
attitudes or “standpoint” is fundamental in these definition. 
A operationalized definition from Gilley is “a state is more legitimate the more 
that it is treated by its citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political 
power” (Gilley, 2006a, p. 48). This definition is what he calls a “simple consensus 
definition” and a definition with no controversy that most researchers would agree 
on (Gilley, 2009, p. 3). Why the definition can be called a consensus definition 
may be an indication of the definition to be too broad or unspecific. Even so, 
Gilley uses this definition and turns it into an operationalized and measurable 
variable, showing that the definition in fact is a useful definition on state 
legitimacy. 
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Max Weber proceeds from a definition based on the state to be recognized as legal 
by its population and the citizen’s willingness to follow a certain “system of rule” 
(Gilley, 2009, p. 3). Max Weber’s base definition on legitimacy is well formulated 
by Beetham as “the belief in legitimacy” (Beetham, 2013, p. 6). This way of 
defining state legitimacy is supported by Schaar, strengthening the role of the 
citizen’s confidence toward their own governments as state legitimacy (Green, 
Levinson, & Schaar, 1970).  
When researchers operationalizes state legitimacy, the frequent way observed is to 
simplify the definition from what is desired to use. This to make it measurable. An 
example of this is Gilley, who, as shown, advocate a quite complex definition of 
state legitimacy in his book. Even so, in the actual operationalization made, state 
legitimacy is stripped down to the citizen’s attitude toward their states, as the 
closest to a measurable variable of state legitimacy.  
Weber and Schaar uses from the beginning more narrow definitions consisting of 
legitimacy being the people’s belief in legitimacy (Beetham, 2013, pp. 8–9). Their 
definitions are in themselves easier to operationalize, even if they only proceeds 
theoretical discussions. These definitions is also on the same path as the thesis 
will define legitimacy as. 
In line with Gilley’s uncontroversial definition of legitimacy, Weber and Schaar, 
this thesis will define state legitimacy as:  
State legitimacy is the citizen’s perception of their own government as legitimate. 
With this, state legitimacy is based on the population’s attitude toward their own 
state. Not to be misunderstood as the elected government and the citizen’s 
misbelief in the government in power (in example that some citizens consider the 
“wrong” party to be in power). With government, I refer to the government as a 
whole. A further discussion on this will be carried out in 6. Analysis.   
This definition and assumption do have weak points. That it is including all 
aspects of the three components of legitimacy, lined up as legality, normative 
validation and consent can be difficult to argue in favor for. Beetham criticizes the 
single use of citizen’s attitudes, based mainly on what he distinguish as belief and 
“justified in terms of belief” (Beetham, 2013, p. 11). Even so, the definitions of 
legitimacy is often on the bottom based on the citizen’s attitudes and beliefs, 
giving the definition used in this thesis steady feet to stand on.  
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3.2 Definition of regulations on conflict of interest 
As the key element of this thesis, conflict of interest will be defined in accordance with 
OECD’s use of the term. What is meant by conflicts of interest will in the thesis be 
defined as OECD writes: “Conflict between the public duty and private interests of 
public officials, in which public officials have private-capacity interests which could 
improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities” 
(Bertók & Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003, p. 15). 
 
Defining only conflict of interest, a definition of regulations is needs as well. By 
regulations the thesis will mean laws or regulations which are effectual without the 
possibility for self-determination or exceptions not specified in the regulations.  
 
Regulations on conflict of interest will therefore be laws or regulations that regulate 
conflicts between the public duty and private interest. A common part included in these 
regulations is quarantine time after leaving a position, which is the part of these 
regulations that have recieved most media attention (Bertók & Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010; OECD iLibrary & Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013). 
 
Further, to clarify; by public officials this text will refer to higher civil servants, 
ministers, undersecretaries of state and others with similar positions within the state. 
Regulations on conflict of interest does not normally include national politicians in the 
parliament. 
3.3 How can regulations on conflict of interest have 
an effect on state legitimacy? 
Why regulations on conflict of interest would have an effect on state legitimacy 
might not seem all clear. The idea is that the presence of regulations on conflict of 
interest will regulate and oversee that public officials behave accordingly to the 
population’s expectations.  
Higher civil servants and public officials are the public face of the state, reflecting 
how well the government is run. It would seem problematic if a minister shortly 
after leaving the minister post takes a job in a company that could have greatly 
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benefitted from a change made by this minister. The reflection of the state in this 
situation could be that the state is illegitimate.  Another example is public officials 
changing to lobbyism, being able to use information and contact which is not 
public knowledge. Regulations on conflict of interest will therefore work as an 
assurance that these problems are dealt with. The presence of conflicts of interest 
might reflect on the government making it less legitimate, which potentially can 
be avoided with regulations on the field. 
Assuming that the population expects that the government is run with the absence 
of conflicts of interest, implementing such regulations could be considered 
moving from being a concept within normative validation to legality (see 2. 
Theoretical background). Turning the shared beliefs into concrete laws makes 
regulations on conflict of interest a part of both components. If the government 
share the same principals and follow the laws on the matter, the idea is that the 
state’s legitimacy will increase.  
3.4 Theoretical scope 
The research of this paper uses only data on the member countries of OECD. This 
gives the advantage of similar countries, eliminating legitimacy issues that differs 
between countries that are highly different in many fundamental factors. All 
countries in the dataset are democracies, giving the same perquisites for achieving 
legitimacy for their population, based on for example the need of reelections. The 
cultural and regional differences that can be difficult to measure will also be 
minimized in choosing only OECD countries. 
One of the disadvantages to be mentioned is the possible decrease in level of 
generalization of the results. Even so, the result would possibly be applicable to 
other democracies not in the data, in example younger democracies or emerging 
democracies. A further discussion on this will be carried out in 6. Analysis.  
3.5 Hypothesis 
The chapters until now leads to this concrete hypothesis in the thesis: 
The presence of regulations on conflict of interest leads to an increase in state 
legitimacy. 
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4 Method and material 
The method of this paper will consist of investigating if there is a connection 
between regulations on conflicts of interests and legitimacy. The way planned to 
do this is through using linear regressions to see if there is a statistical significance 
between countries with these regulations and higher levels of legitimacy. The 
choice of multiple regression is based on the many potential variables that might 
have an effect on legitimacy. Preforming multiple regression is an attempt to 
isolate and see if the independent variable (here: regulations on conflict of 
interest) have a significant effect or not on the dependent variable (here: 
confidence in national government) (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, pp. 80–83). 
Control variables will be presented, added and explained further down in this 
section. Control variables is necessary when testing a variable like this for many 
reasons, but the main reason is the many possible explanations on the effects on 
state legitimacy.  
The independent variables tested in this thesis is a specific and narrow variable. 
This is an advantage in comparison to the control variables, which all are broad 
variables, where finding and using exact measures is more difficult. The use of the 
results when having a narrow variables, also makes the concrete answer more 
clear. Using the research on narrow variables is easier when turning them into 
actual measures in the society, compared to broad variables without a concrete 
measure. Operationalize variables that are broad is also challenging, because of 
the high probability that a control variable will measure to broad or to narrow 
compared to the wanted variable. The more specific the variable, the easier it is to 
operationalize and measure what is desired to measure, a great advantage with the 
independent variable (regulations on conflict of interest) in this thesis. 
The data chosen is cross-sectional, and the year of the chosen data is 2010 (with 
exceptions, where available data is from 2009). The data for the dependent 
variable is from 2012 (Gallup World Poll, 2012; Teorell et al., 2015). The two 
(three) year gap between the variables is not an optimal gap. The variables could 
possibly have changed in these year. Even so, considering they are all years after 
the financial crisis and that many of the variables are variables with quite stable 
numbers within the OECD countries, they most likely do not experience large 
changes over short periods of time, so this will not be considered a problem 
further in the thesis. 
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Using cross sectional data has its delimitations. By choosing cross sectional data, 
proving a causal relationship is difficult. Time series data would in that way give 
more information and strength to the results. Also combining data with qualitative 
information would increase the explanation degree (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, pp. 
80–81). Even so, cross sectional data was chosen in this thesis, based on the 
subject chosen, available data and the limits of the study, giving the possibility to 
test the data in a greater extent. 
4.1 Operationalization of variables 
4.1.1 Dependent variable: Confidence in National Government 
 
The dependent variable, state legitimacy, in this study operationalized as 
“Confidence in National Government”. My choice of dependent variable is based 
on the definition made in 3.1 Definition of state legitimacy. This again is based on 
the people’s beliefs or attitudes towards their government. ”Confidence in 
National Government” is therefore an operationalization made for capturing the 
measurement wished for in the study. 
The variable is a result of a poll where 1000 citizens from each country answered 
the question: "In this country, do you have confidence in each of the following, or 
not? How about national government?”. The result is reported as the percentage 
that answered yes. Given that the result is in percentage, the scale of the variable 
goes from 0-100, where 100 is total confidence in national government, while 0 is 
equal to no confidence at all (Gallup World Poll, 2012). The dependent variable, 
and the question leading to the data has as any variable, its weakness’ which will 
be further discussed in 6. Analysis. 
4.1.2 Independent variable: Regulations on Conflict of Interest 
To be able to carry out the method in this paper, a variable on regulations on 
conflict of interest is needed. This variable does not need to give more 
information than if the country have or do not have these regulations. The 
information on which countries that do have these regulations is collected from 
OECD, and the variable is created based on this information (Bertók & 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010). Countries 
without regulations was gives the value 0 and the countries with regulation was 
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given the value 1. The variable is then a dichotomy variable. Information on 
Estonia and Israel is missing, and is therefore not a part of the dataset. 
4.1.3 Control variables 
The choice of control variables is based on previous research on legitimacy (see 2. 
Theoretical background). Included in this study is the variables that according to the 
literature presented earlier have had the largest impact on legitimacy. All control 
variables is collected from the OECD dataset of Quality of Government (Teorell et al., 
2015).  
 
The control variables intended to be included in the regression is divided in three 
groups, in an effort to make the choices of variables more understandable and 
structured. 
Governance:  
The aim is to encapsulate general governance within the countries. As this is an 
important area within explaining legitimacy, several variables will be included. 
Functioning of government, economical & political institutional quality, political 
stability, government effectiveness and level of corruption will be used as control 
variables, all presented as possible contributors to state legitimacy (Beetham, 
2013, p. 37–ff; Gilley, 2006a, pp. 49–55; Merriam, 1945, pp. 31–35). Merriam 
also presented security as an individual variable (Merriam, 1945, pp. 30–32). 
Based on the choice of OECD-countries and the low differentiation on the 
variable, security will not be included in the model (Teorell et al., 2015). 
Rights: 
Within the area of rights, many factors is possible to include. In an attempt to 
include the most important ones, the variables of rule of law, gender equality and 
democratic rights are included. Rule of law is the variable most likely to explain 
the part of legality within the theory of state legitimacy, while democratic rights 
and gender equality has been presented as important factors by others as variables 
with high explanatory effect (Beetham, 2013, p. 3–ff; Gilley, 2009, p. 5–ff). 
Welfare:  
In measuring welfare, public services and net social expenditure is chosen. One 
describes how much of the services the public stands for, the other the amount 
spent on these services. This will give a balanced view on the concept of welfare 
and how this is performed in the countries. Welfare is considered a variables that 
has been argued to explain state legitimacy, see 2. Theoretical background. 
 
 16 
 
 
 
Below is the variables descriptive presented. This gives an impression of their 
characteristics and measurements, showing how the variable values differ between 
the included countries. This is a table including the dependent variable, and as the 
table show, the confidence in national government in the OECD countries reaches 
from 13 to 77, which it quite a large gap. 
 
 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Confidence in National Government 32 41.0625 16.72151 13 77 
Regulations on Conflict of Interest 32 0.59375 0.4989909 0 1 
Rule of Law 32 13.875 2.225222 6 16 
Political Institutional Quality 30 1.314922 0.5748503 -0.09623 1.98582 
Government Effectiveness 32 1.340899 0.5538058 0.144244 2.245212 
Levels of Corruption 32 1.301861 0.8552506 -0.37029 2.413564 
Gender Equality 32 0.7186 0.0582716 0.5828 0.8276 
Political Stability 32 0.717857 0.5603207 -0.92075 1.441499 
GDP per Capita (PPP) US Dollars 32 34583.16 13402.96 15160.51 84763.73 
Net Social Expenditure 29 22.28763 5.469347 8.757874 32.05172 
Economic Institutional Quality 32 0.965457 0.544521 -0.14144 1.827632 
ICRG Indicator of QoG 32 0.80136 0.148095 0.5 1 
Political Rights 32 1.125 0.4918694 1 3 
Functioning of Government 32 11 1.367833 7 12 
Public Services             32 2.4875 1.23177 1.1 5.8 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of all variables 
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5 Empirical results 
In this chapter, the results from the empirical study will be presented. First, a 
preliminary descriptive statistic is presented, with the purpose to demonstrate how 
the data on the dependent and independent variables are divided and to get an 
impression of the data and results. Further, multiple regressions will be run, 
testing for potential problems with the model. The two tests chosen is one test for 
multicollinearity and one for heteroskedasticity, trying to avoid correlation and 
giving a picture of how well the model fits. The chapter will end in a summary of 
the results. 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
To get a first look of my chosen variables and their relation, staples of the 
dependent and independent variables “Confidence in National Government” and 
“Regulations on conflict of interest” is performed. The staples show the mean of 
“Confidence in National Government” in percentage. The staples are divided in 
the countries who have respectively do not have regulations on conflict of interest. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
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The diagram does not give a significant results, which does not provide us with a 
clear indicator whether or not regulations on conflict of interest and legitimacy 
have a relation. It does show that the difference between the two groups is not 
considerable, and this leads us to further investigate the data using other methods. 
5.2 Regression 
To be able to answer the question of issue, running regressions to test the 
significance of regulations on conflict of interest is necessary. Several multiple 
regression on cross sectional data is performed, testing first for possible 
multicollinearity, then heteroskedasticity, before ending up with a result giving an 
answer to the question of issue. 
In this first model presented below, all control variables are included. As the table 
show, regulations on conflict of interest is not significant, which would imply that 
these types of regulations does not lead to an increase in a state’s legitimacy. 
Other variables are significant, but this model will not be considered a result 
before going through tests on the model. This is a first result, but tests for 
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity will be done and more regressions will be 
performed before reaching a conclusion on the impact of regulation on conflict of 
interest, then using the model with the best fit. When reaching the model with the 
best fit, it would also be possible to say something about the control variables 
impact on state legitimacy. 
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VARIABLES 
Confidence in 
National 
Government 
                              
Regulations on Conflict of Interest -6.884 
 
-4.675 
Level of Corruption -36.84* 
 
-19.39 
Government Effectiveness 29.99 
 
-17.34 
Political Institutional Quality 77 
 
-43.96 
Rule of Law -2.048 
 
-3.297 
Gender of Quality 73.48 
 
-69.75 
Political Stability -34.72** 
 
-12.18 
GDP per Capita (PPP) US Dollar  -0.000939** 
 
-0.000382 
Net Social Expenditure -0.978 
 
-0.554 
Economic Institutional Quality 17.69* 
 
-9.457 
ICRG Indicator of QoG -13.4 
 
-98.11 
Political Rights -1.462 
 
-16.99 
Functioning of Government -12.60** 
 
-5.577 
Public Services -7.264 
 
-5.137 
Constant 155.8** 
 
-68.62 
  Observations 27 
R-squared                                  0.829 
Adjusted R-squared 0.629 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  Adjusted R-squared 0.629 
Table 3. Regression with all control variables 
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5.2.1 VIF-test 
It would be reasonable to assume that some of the variables included in the model 
above potentially have too high degrees of multicollinearity. That means that the 
variables in the model correlate (explain the same) in such a degree that the model 
does not give correct answers (Verbeek, 2012, p. 40–ff). This is because of the 
related variables chosen (in example, the variables in the group of governance), 
that possibly explain parts of the same factor. It is desirable to end up with the 
model with the best fit, giving the most correct results, which again will give us 
an indication on whether or not regulations on conflict have an impact on state 
legitimacy.  
To test for multicollinearity, a VIF-test was performed on the model giving this 
result: 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Political Institutional Quality 79.38 0.012597
ICRG Indicators of Quality of Government 62.26 0.016062
Levels of Corruption 46.42 0.021541
Government Effectiveness 26.05 0.038395
Political Rights 24.64 0.04058
Rule of Law 16.56 0.060374
Public Services 12.89 0.077569
Functioning of Government 11.53 0.086739
Economic Institutional Quality 7.97 0.125451
Gender Equality 5.03 0.198684
GDP per Capita (PPP) USD 4.35 0.229833
Net Social Expenditures 2.49 0.402013
Regulations on Conflict of Interest 1.45 0.691747
Mean VIF 23.16
Table 4. VIF-test with all control variables 
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When experiencing a VIF- level above 10 there is an established thumb rule to 
suspect multicollinearity between the variables (Verbeek, 2012, p. 44). As seen in 
the performed VIF-test, it is reason to suspect high degrees of multicollinearity, 
given that the highest VIF value is 79.38 (Political Institutional Quality), and the 
average VIF is 23.16.  
To clarify, “Regulations on Conflict of Interest” is not suspected to correlate with 
the other variables, as we can see in the table (VIF value of 1.45). Even so, 
correcting for multicollinearity might give the model a better fit in general, 
making the explanation level higher, which also might have an effect on the 
significance for the independent variable “Regulation on Conflict of Interest” that 
we are interested in.  
In an attempt to create a model with a better fit, four variables with the highest 
VIF’s (Political Institutional Quality, Government Effectiveness, Levels of 
Corruption and ICRG Indicators of Quality of Government) were removed, due to 
the small changes in VIF levels when not removing all four. A plausible 
explanation for the need to remove all four, is that these variables not only highly 
correlate with each other, but also with variables like Functioning of Government, 
Rule of Law and Political Rights. In example, the variable “Functioning of 
Government” includes corruption as a measurement in the variable (Teorell et al., 
2015). This gives us that levels of corruption is not left out of the model by 
removing it, but is included in another, broader variable. The same reasoning can 
be carried out with all four variables. 
The variable of “Levels of Corruption” is in this first model (table 3) significant, 
but considering that this is a bigger part of the measurement of “Functioning of 
Government”, removing this variable will not further be considered a problem. All 
these four variables with high VIF results are not included in the further 
regressions, in an attempt to get more accurate results and the rightful significance 
of the variable “Regulations on Conflict of Interest”.  
After removing the four variables mentioned above from the regression, a new 
VIF-test was performed, to control that the new model does not have high levels 
of multicollinearity. The new VIF results show that the level of multicollinearity 
has decreased to a much lower level, making it possible to argue that all variables 
in the regression now is relevant and not correlating at a level which affects the 
results. The second VIF-test gave these numbers: 
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The possibility for the model to suffer from multicollinearity has decreased to an 
acceptable level, only leaving two variables just above 10, where multicollinearity 
is to suspect. In order to include as many control variables as possible, these two 
variables will be included further, being important explanatory variables of state 
legitimacy. 
To continue the study, regressions adding one variable at a time was performed 
(see table 6). These regressions show that regulations on conflict of interest still 
do not have a significant effect on state legitimacy. Adding one variable at a time, 
we can see the how the variables affect each other and the explanation level of the 
model (R-Square). Regulations on conflict of interest does not turn significant in 
any of the regressions performed in table 6. The last regression, regression 9, 
includes the most control variables and has the highest explanatory degree 
(highest R square). This is also the model we are left with after controlling for 
multicollinearity. Before concluding on whether or not this is the model with the 
best fit another test, testing for heteroskedasticity will be performed, in order to in 
a greater scale be able to trust the results. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Functioning of Government 12.26 0.08156
Rule of Law 10.4 0.096155
Political Rights 7.77 0.128748
Political Stability 4.58 0.218471
Public Services 4.39 0.227559
Economic Institutional Quality 3.37 0.297112
Gender Equality 3.16 0.316177
Net Social Expenditure 2.54 0.393733
GDP per Capita (PPP) USD 2.12 0.472264
Regulations on Conflict of Interest 1.35 0.738229
Mean VIF 5.19
Table 5. Result of VIF-test on the model without the four 
variables with the highest VIF's 
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VARIABLES Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 Reg. 6 Reg. 7 Reg. 8 Reg. 9 Reg. 10
Regulations on Conflict of interest 0.364 0.193 0.927 1.515 -1.634 -4.821 -4.905 -1.711 -6.366 -6.487
(-6.118) (-6.166) (-6.367) (-6.203) (-5.907) (-5.342) (-5.367) (-5.84) (-4.73) (-4.693)
GDP per Capita (PPP) USD 0.000174 0.000268 0.000226 -7.24E-06 -0.000181 -0.00022 -0.000183 -0.000366* -0.000298
(-0.00023) (-0.000284) (-0.000278) (-0.000276) (-0.000252) (-0.000257) (-0.000252) (-0.000203) (-0.00021)
Rule of Law -1.001 -5.773 -7.783** -3.676 -3.561 -4.62 -1.624 -0.557
(-1.74) (-3.407) (-3.274) (-3.231) (-3.248) (-3.265) (-2.674) (-2.813)
Functioning of Government 8.736 5.752 7.107 8.871* 5.844 -3.197 -5.36
(-5.412) (-5.177) (-4.605) (-5.04) (-5.126) (-4.685) (-5.019)
Public Services -10.26** -11.42*** -12.52*** -12.08*** -9.039** -8.912
(-4.405) (-3.918) (-4.128) (-4.121) (-3.321) (-3.296)
Political Rights 25.99*** 28.34*** 15.31 14.92 -8.611
(-9.066) (-9.488) (-11.58) (-9.047) (-10.54)
Gender Equality -59.91 -22.48 -25.03 2.134
(-67.99) (-67.98) (-53.09) (-57.8)
Net Social Expenditure -0.703 -0.435 -0.669
(-0.678) (-0.534) (-0.568)
Economic Institutional Quality 24.25*** 26.08***
(-6.529) (-6.673)
Political Stability -8.527
(-7.468)
Constant 40.85*** 34.93*** 45.12** 16.36 112.5** 22.2 45.72 92.95 125.4** 129.0**
(-4.714) (-9.135) (-19.99) (-26.37) (-47.98) (-52.86) (-59.43) (-65.36) (-51.78) (-51.47)
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 29 29 29
R-squared 0 0.02 0.031 0.116 0.269 0.45 0.467 0.426 0.667 0.69
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Confidence in National Government
Table 6. Regressions adding one control variable at a time 
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5.2.2 Test for heteroskedasticity 
 
As a last test of the model in the thesis, a test for heteroskedasticity will be 
performed. Heteroskedasticity is easily explained as the models ability to predict 
the dependent value across all values of this variable, using the residuals of the 
model. Testing for heteroskedasticity is important in determining if the model can 
predict what it is desired to predict and the accuracy of these predictions. If a 
model is very heteroskedastic, using the model in a study would not give true 
answers (Verbeek, 2012). 
The test to investigate the presence of heteroskedasticity chosen is the Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity, testing if there is a constant 
variance or not. This is done using a null hypothesis, which in the test is constant 
variance, and the null hypothesis is rejected at a 5% level. This means that if the 
p-value of the test is lower than 0.05, the null hypothesis will be rejected and the 
model will have problems with heteroskedasticity (Verbeek, 2012). 
The test performed on the model in this thesis gave these results: 
 
The p-value (Prob > chi2) here is clearly above 5% (65.86%), and the null 
hypothesis of constant variance is therefore accepted. From this we can conclude 
that the model is not heteroskedastic, giving that we can trust the model to give 
correct predictions and is a model with a good fit for the further analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
chi2(1) = 0.2
Prob > chi2 = 0.6586
Table 7. Result for the 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test 
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5.3 Final results 
These previous tests leads us to accept the last model, regression 9, as the optimal 
model in this thesis. The model is controlling for the most important variables 
without having problems with multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. A few 
variables was left out, removing the problems the model had with 
multicollinearity. The analysis and conclusion of this study will therefore be based 
on the result of this model. 
In the optimal model (regression 9, see table 8), the significant variables are 
Public Services and Economic Institutional Quality, implying that these are the 
factors that will have an effect on state legitimacy. Economic Institutional Quality 
is the only variable with a three-star significance, and interpreting the result for 
this variable as a one increase (improvement) in Economic Institutional Quality 
would give a 26.08 increase in state legitimacy. This is large increase, considering 
the scale of state legitimacy (or the variable Confidence in National Government) 
is a scale between 1 and 100. Even so, the measurement of the Economic 
Institutional Quality has a very low range, giving that an increase of 1 would be a 
significant increase in this variable. 
The other variable with significance is Public Services. This variable has a 
negative coefficient, leading us to interpret that an increase in Public Services 
would lead to a decrease in state legitimacy. This would seem illogical, given the 
theories on welfare as a factor on state legitimacy presented in 2. Theoretical 
background. This might be the result of measurement errors or weaknesses in the 
model, giving the variable the wrong outcome, or it might be a connection as the 
model presents. Even if this is an interesting result, I will not further speculate in 
why this result is negative nor discuss this variable itself in the continuation.  
As for the independent variable, regulations on conflict of interest is not 
significant, leading us to the conclusion that through this model, these types of 
regulations does not have an effect on legitimacy. The variable is not significant in 
any of the regressions run, leading us towards a conclusion of a robust and 
trustworthy result. A further discussion will be carried out in the next chapter, 6. 
Analysis. 
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VARIABLES Regression 9
Regulations on Conflict of interest -6.487
(-4.693)
GDP per Capita (PPP) USD -0.000298
(-0.00021)
Rule of Law -0.557
(-2.813)
Functioning of Government -5.36
(-5.019)
Public Services -8.912**
(-3.296)
Political Rights 8.611
(-10.54)
Gender Equality 2.134
(-57.8)
Net Social Expenditure -0.669
(-0.568)
Economic Institutional Quality 26.08***
(-6.673)
Political Stability -8.527
(-7.468)
Constant 129.0**
(-51.47)
Observations 29
R-squared -0.69
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8. Final model 
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6 Analysis 
The empirical results in this study suggests that the presence of regulations on 
conflict of interest does not have an impact on a state’s legitimacy. This 
conclusion is reached based on the lack of a significant results in the regression 
model with the best fit (see table 8). The result is the opposite of the expected 
effect from the argumentation of OECD and other organizations, as well as the 
thesis’ hypothesis. The result of regulations on conflict of interest not being 
significant further suggest that to increase state legitimacy, the focus should be 
shifted  towards other factors.  
OECD recommending these regulations might therefore not have the desired 
effect that is argued for in their reports. GRECO and ESO also argues in favor of 
these regulations, using the same line of arguments as can be found in the OECD 
reports. This could be seen as a consequence when policy comes before research. 
The reasoning of how and why these regulations should have an effect is clear and 
logical in the report presented by OECD, but theory and practice can differ, which 
in this case is what is being suggested. 
Even so, OECD’s recommendations might have other positive effects not testes in 
the thesis. The main argument of increasing the population’s confidence in their 
own government did not show to be true in this thesis, but that does not mean the 
regulations does not have any positive effects. It might be a factor in controlling 
corruption or other factors that more indirect or not at all are connected with state 
legitimacy. 
Implementing these regulations is not a demanding procedure in any country, and 
with only even the possibility for it to increase state legitimacy, it might seem like 
an argument in itself. Even so, some negative effects of these regulations are 
presented and used arguing against the implementations of regulations on conflict 
of interest. The increased difficulty in recruiting qualified employees is a strong 
argument, along with the economic side of carrying through quarantine time, other 
consequences and side effects. The choice of implementing these regulations can 
therefore be turned into an economic trade off, with costs and benefits on both 
implementing and not. 
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In the defense of the argument that regulations on conflict of interest in fact do 
increase state legitimacy, the dependent variable might be a cause of misleading 
results. The question is formulated in a possible unfortunate way, which might 
give incorrect answers. Misunderstanding “confidence in national government” as 
the government in power, not the state in itself is a possibility. This leading the 
ones asked to answer “no” if they do not agree on who is government in power, 
instead of the legitimacy of the government as a whole. If this is correct, the 
model might not give a significant result even if regulations on conflict of interest 
in fact is significant. 
A different view on the dependent variable could be that based on the high 
degrees of general welfare in the OECD countries, the citizens are more likely to 
accept their governments as legitimate. The idea is that the higher the level of 
welfare, the happier the population will be in general, not thinking of their 
government as illegitimate even if this might be the case. This is a measurement 
problem difficult to control for, using the operationalization of 4.1.1, Dependent 
variable: Confidence in National Government. 
The study only uses the OECD-countries in the empirical investigation. These are 
all more or less stable democracies. A trail of thought is that regulations on 
conflict of interest might have a greater effect (or an effect at all) if tested on other 
countries that in example are weaker or younger democracies. This is though for 
another study to investigate.  
When going back to the theoretical background of the thesis, it gives a different 
point of view when concluding that the implementation of regulations of conflict 
is not relevant in increasing state legitimacy. This result could have at least two 
angles of approach looking at the key components of legitimacy (The key 
components are presented and explained in 2.Theoretical background).  
One view is that legality is not as important of a component as others when 
explaining state legitimacy, in line with Gilley’s weighing of the key components. 
Implementing regulations on conflict of interest will therefore be a small change 
within legality as a component, with legality itself as a component contributing 
with a minor degree of explaining legitimacy. The implementation of these 
regulations will therefore not lead to that the perception of the government’s 
legitimacy is changed. 
Another point of view that can be obtained from the theoretical background is that 
the absence of conflict of interest from higher civil servants and public officials is 
already expected from both the population and themselves. From this, it is logical 
to assume that this behavior and the expectation of it is already is a part of what in 
this thesis is called normative validation. Moving this behavior (absence of 
conflicts of interest) from the component of normative validation to legality when 
making it a formalized regulation, would not have an impact when testing this 
statistically, with the thought that they have an equal effect on state legitimacy.  
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This would though imply that the absence of conflict of interest has an impact on 
legitimacy. 
If we do accept that the model in this study presents correct results, it is also 
interesting to see how big of an effect the model suggests that economic 
institutional quality has. The model suggests a large change in confidence in 
national government when improving the economic institutions. The variable 
Public Services is also significant, but based on the result of this variable, it is 
difficult to say something certain (see. 5.3 Final results). 
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7 Conclusion 
To conclude, this study has not shown that the presence of regulations on conflict 
of interest would imply higher state legitimacy. This could be explained in many 
different ways, which is attempted in 6. Analysis.  
The lack of impact regulations on conflict of interest has on state legitimacy leads 
the thesis to reject the argumentation presented by OECD on the effect on state 
legitimacy when implementing regulations on conflict of interest. The thesis does 
not give OECD support for the arguments used to formalize regulations on 
conflict of interest as a legitimacy increasing measure, leaving the policies as 
possible empty words. Even so, the regulations might have other positive effects 
not detected in this thesis. 
Explanations on the not significant result is discussed, like measurement errors 
and operationalization difficulties. Theoretical reasoning gives further input on if 
and why the results is not significant using legality and normative validation. 
These speak both in favor and against these regulations as needed.  
The result of the thesis suggests that when confronting the “legitimacy crisis” 
Europe is in presented in the introduction, other measures than the implementation 
of regulations on conflict of interest would most likely give the most efficient 
result. Regulations on conflict of interest is, as shown in this thesis, not the first 
and most efficient tool for improving state legitimacy. 
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8 Suggestions for further research 
There are many aspects on the subject that would be interesting to further study, 
given that the results argues against OECD’s argumentation.  
Performing this study with a larger number of countries would increase the 
strength of the conclusion in this thesis. Testing for weaker and younger 
democracies would possibly strengthen or weaken the statements made in this 
thesis. Increasing the number of control variables would also give more power to 
the conclusion reached, also choosing more concrete variables in the model. These 
are both more time consuming studies, dealing with more complex data. 
It would be complementing for this thesis to study the positive and negative 
effects of the regulations, looking at economic consequences of implementing 
versus not implementing the regulations. This would give a picture of whether or 
not these regulations improve the government, or is only an obstacle. 
A more broad study on what measures do have a positive effect on state 
legitimacy, giving more quantitative support for measures that concrete will 
improve a state’s legitimacy, would also be a further study interesting to carry out. 
Further, testing other policies recommended from OECD and other organization 
on the field of public officials and higher civil servants would maybe give a 
broader look on their total policy recommendations and the hold in these. 
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